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Abstract 
We use data from a large-scale field experiment to explore what influences the 
effectiveness of online advertising. We find that matching an ad to website content 
and increasing an ad’s obtrusiveness independently increase purchase intent. 
However, in combination these two strategies are ineffective. Ads that match both 
website content and are obtrusive do worse at increasing purchase intent than ads 
that do only one or the other. This failure appears to be related to privacy concerns: 
The negative effect of combining targeting with obtrusiveness is strongest for people 
who refuse to give their income, and for categories where privacy matters most. Our 
results suggest a possible explanation for the growing bifurcation in internet 
advertising between highly targeted plain text ads and more visually striking but less 
targeted ads.  
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1. Introduction 
Customers actively avoid looking at online banner ads (Dreze and Hussherr 2003). 
Response rates to banner ads have fallen dramatically over time (Hollis 2005). In reaction to this, 
online advertising on websites has developed along two strikingly distinct paths.  
On the one hand, the $11.2 billion1 online display advertising market has evolved beyond 
traditional banner ads to include many visual and audio features that make ads more obtrusive 
and harder to ignore. On the other hand, Google has developed a highly profitable non-search 
display advertising division (called AdSense) that generates an estimated $6 billion in revenues 
by displaying plain content-targeted text ads: 76% of US internet users are estimated to have 
been exposed to AdSense ads.2 This paper explores how well these divergent strategies work for 
online advertising, and how consumer perceptions of intrusiveness and privacy influence their 
success or lack of it, both independently and in combination. 
We examine the effectiveness of these strategies using data from a large randomized field 
experiment on 2,892 distinct web advertising campaigns that were placed on different websites. 
On average, we have data on 852 survey-takers for each campaign. Of these, half were randomly 
exposed to the ad, and half were not exposed to the ad but did visit the website on which the ad 
appeared. These campaigns advertised a large variety of distinct products, and were run on many 
different websites.  
The advertisers in our data used two core improvements on standard banner ad campaigns 
to attract their audience. (1) Some web campaigns matched the product they advertised to the 
website content, for example when auto manufacturers placed their ads on auto websites. (2) 
                                                 
1 Hallerman (2009). 
2 Estimates generated from Google quarterly earnings report for June 30, 2009 "Form 10-Q", filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  
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Some web campaigns deliberately tried to make their ad stand out from the content by using 
video, creating a pop-up, or having the ad take over the webpage. This paper evaluates whether 
“targeted” campaigns that complemented the website content, “obtrusive” campaigns that strove 
to be highly visible relative to the website content, or campaigns that did both, were most 
successful at influencing stated purchase intent, measured as the difference between the group 
that was exposed to the ad and the group that was not.  
We construct and estimate a reduced-form model of an ad effectiveness function. 
Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Goldfarb and Tucker 2009; Wilbur, Goeree, and Ridder 
2009), our results suggest that matching an ad's content to the website content increased stated 
purchase intent among exposed consumers. Also consistent with prior literature (e.g. Cole, 
Spalding, and Fayer 2009), our results suggest that increasing the obtrusiveness of the ad 
increased purchase intent. Surprisingly, however, we find that these two ways of improving 
online display advertising performance negate each other: Combining them nullifies the positive 
effect that each strategy has independently. These results are robust to multiple specifications, 
including one that addresses the potential endogeneity of campaign format by restricting our 
analysis to campaigns that were run both on sites that matched the product and sites that did not.  
These results have important economic implications for the $664 million that we estimate 
is currently spent on ads that are both targeted and obtrusive. If advertisers replace ads that 
combine contextual targeting and high visibility with the standard ads that our estimates suggest 
are equally effective, we provide back-of-the-envelope calculations that suggest advertisers 
could cut ad spending by over 5% without affecting ad performance.  
It is not obvious why increasing visibility and increasing the match to content should 
work well separately but not together. It does not appear to be explained by differences in ad 
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recall. Consistent with several laboratory experiments in other settings (Mandler 1982; Heckler 
and Childers 1992), we find that contextually-targeted ads are recalled less, while highly visible 
ads are recalled more. However, we find that highly visible ads are not recalled significantly less 
if they are matched to the context. This suggests that the negation mechanism is explained by a 
difference in how successful the ad is at influencing customer behavior after customers see it, 
rather than because of differences in ad recall.  
The literature on consumer response to persuasion attempts provides an alternative 
explanation: Obtrusive ads may lead consumers to infer that the advertiser is trying to manipulate 
them, reducing purchase intentions (Campbell 1995). Specifically, increased processing attention 
may lead the consumer to think about why a particular advertising tactic was used (Campbell 
1995; Friestad and Wright 1994). If the tactic is perceived as manipulative, it will have a 
negative effect on consumer perceptions of the product advertised. Given that deception is 
particularly easy online, consumer awareness of manipulation is higher too (Boush, Friestad, and 
Wright 2009). This suggests that targeted and obtrusive banner ads, by increasing the attention 
paid to the tactic of targeting, may generate consumer perceptions of manipulation. Therefore, 
while there is a relatively high consumer tolerance to targeted ads because the information is 
perceived as useful (e.g. Cho and Cheon 2003; Edwards, Li, and Less 2002; Wang, Chen, and 
Chang 2008), this tolerance may be overwhelmed by perceptions of manipulation when the ad is 
obtrusive.  
Why might the negative consequences of perceived manipulation from using techniques 
to make ads obtrusive be higher if they are targeted? Privacy concerns provide a possible answer. 
Both Turow et al. (2009) and Wathieu and Friedman (2009) document that customer 
appreciation of the informativeness of targeted ads is tempered by privacy concerns. When 
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privacy concerns are more salient, consumers are more likely to have a prevention focus (Van 
Noort, Kerkhof, and Fennis 2008), in which they are more sensitive to the absence or presence of 
negative outcomes, instead of a promotion focus in which they are more sensitive to the absence 
or presence of positive outcomes. Kirmani and Zhu (2007) show that prevention focus is 
associated with increased sensitivity to manipulative intent, suggesting a likely avenue for the 
relationship between targeted ads, privacy concerns, and perceived manipulative intent that 
arises from making ads more obtrusive. 
We explore empirically whether it is privacy concerns that drive the negative effect we 
observe of combining targeting and obtrusiveness. We find evidence that supports this view: 
Contextual targeting and high visibility (obtrusiveness) are much stronger substitutes for people 
who refused to answer a potentially intrusive question on income. They are also stronger 
substitutes in categories in which privacy might be seen as relatively important (such as financial 
and health products).  
In addition to our major finding that obtrusiveness and targeting do not work well in 
combination, and the link this has with consumer perceptions of privacy, we make several other 
contributions that help illuminate online advertising. Our examination of many campaigns across 
many industries complements the single-firm approach of the existing quantitative literature on 
online advertising effectiveness. For example, Manchanda et al. (2006) use data from a 
healthcare and beauty product internet-only firm in their examination of how banner ad 
exposures affect sales. Similarly, Lewis and Reiley (2009), Rutz and Bucklin (2009), Chatterjee, 
Hoffman, and Novak (2003), and Ghose and Yang (2009) all examine campaigns run by just one 
firm. Those studies have given us a much deeper understanding of the relationship between 
online advertising and purchasing, but their focus on particular firms and campaigns makes it 
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difficult to draw general conclusions about online advertising. In contrast, our research gives a 
sense of the average effectiveness of online advertising—it boosts stated purchase intent by 3-
4%—and our research suggests that at current advertising prices, plain banner ads pay off if an 
increase in purchase intent by one consumer is worth roughly 42 cents to the advertiser. Our 
results also emphasize that there is a role for cross-category and campaign advertising studies 
because they allow us to examine factors that vary across campaigns like campaign visibility and 
category characteristics.  
The trade-off between perceived intrusiveness and usefulness may help explain the 
unexpected success of products such as Google's AdSense, which generates roughly one third of 
Google's advertising revenues (the other two thirds coming directly from search advertising). 
AdSense allows advertisers to place very plain-looking ads—they are identical in appearance to 
Google’s search ads—on websites with closely matched content. Our findings suggest that 
making these ads more visually striking could be counterproductive, or at least waste advertising 
budget. More generally, the results suggest two alternative, viable routes to online display 
advertising success: Putting resources into increasing the visibility of ads, and putting resources 
into the targeting of ads to context, but not doing both.  
2. Data on Display Advertising 
We use data from a large database of surveys collected by a media measurement agency 
to examine the effectiveness of different ad campaigns. These surveys are based on a randomized 
exposed and control allocation. Individuals browsing the website where the campaign is running 
are either exposed to the ads, or not, based on the randomized operation of the ad server. On 
average 198 subjects are recruited for each website running a particular campaign with an 
6 
 
 
 
average of 852 subjects being recruited across all websites for each ad campaign. The average 
campaign lasted 55 days (median 49 days).  
We excluded ad campaigns run on websites that were described as “other” because it was 
not possible to identify whether there was a contextual match. We also excluded ads for alcohol 
because there were no contextually targeted alcohol ads in the data. Finally, we excluded ads for 
prescription drugs because FTC regulations (which require reporting of side-effects) restrict their 
format. 
Both exposed and non-exposed (control) respondents are recruited via an online survey 
invitation that appears after they have finished browsing the website. Therefore, our coefficients 
reflect the stated preferences of consumers who are willing to answer an online poll. The 
company that makes these data available has done multiple checks to confirm the general 
representativeness of this survey among consumers. In section 4.4, we find that the main 
negative interaction effect that we study is larger for people who refuse to answer an (intrusive) 
question on income, so it is even possible that the selection in our subject pool away from those 
who prefer not to answer surveys leads us to understate the magnitude of this negative 
interaction.  
Because of the random nature of the advertising allocation, both exposed and control 
groups have similar unobservable characteristics, such as the same likelihood of seeing offline 
ads. The only variable of difference between the two groups is the randomized presence of the ad 
campaign being measured. This means that differences in consumer preferences toward the 
advertiser’s product can be attributed to the online campaign. 
This online questionnaire asked the extent to which a respondent was likely to purchase a 
variety of products (including the one studied) or had a favorable opinion of the product using a 
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five-point scale. The data also contained information about whether the respondent recalled 
seeing the ad. After collecting all other information at the end of the survey, the survey displayed 
the ad, alongside some decoy ads for other products, and the respondents were asked whether 
they recalled seeing any of the ads. If they responded that they had seen the focal ad, then we 
code this variable as one and as zero otherwise. 
An important strength of this data set is that it contains a large number of campaigns 
across a variety of categories, including automotive, apparel, consumer packaged goods, energy, 
entertainment, financial services, home improvement, retail, technology, telecommunications, 
travel, and many others. Therefore, like Clark, Doraszelski, and Draganska’s (2009) study of 
offline advertising, we can draw very general conclusions about online display advertising. Our 
data have the further advantage of allowing us to explore ad recall and purchase intent 
separately.  
The survey also asked respondents about their income, age, and the number of hours 
spent on the internet. We use these as controls in our regressions. We converted them to zero-
mean-standardized measures. This allowed us to “zero out” missing data.3 In Table 3, we show 
robustness to a non-parametric specification for the missing data by discretizing the variables 
with missing information. We also show robustness to excluding the controls.  
In addition to data from this questionnaire for each website user, our data set also 
documents the characteristics of the website where the advertisement appeared and the 
characteristics of the advertisement itself. We used this data to define both whether the ad was 
“Contextually Targeted” and whether it was obtrusive or “High Visibility.” 
                                                 
3 Data are missing for two reasons: sometimes that question was not asked, and sometimes respondents refused to 
answer. We have no income information for 28% of respondents; no age information for 2% of respondents; and no 
hours online information for 34% of respondents. 
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2.1 Defining Contextually-Targeted Advertising 
To define whether a product matched the website that displayed it, we matched up the 
364 narrow categories of products, with the 37 categories of websites described in the data.4 A 
banner ad for a cruise would be a “Contextually-Targeted Ad” if it was displayed on a website 
devoted to “Travel and Leisure”. Similarly, a banner ad for a new computer would be a 
“Contextually-Targeted Ad” if it was displayed on a site devoted to “Computing and 
Technology”. As indicated in Table 1a, 10 percent of campaigns were run on sites where the 
product and website content matched.  
2.2 Defining High Visibility (Obtrusive) Advertising 
 
We define an ad as high-visibility if it has one of the following characteristics:  
 Pop-Up: The ad appears in a new window above the existing window. 
 Pop-Under: The ad appears in a new window that lies underneath the existing window 
 In-stream Video and Audio: The ad is part of a video stream.  
 Takeover: The ad briefly usurps the on-screen space a webpage has devoted to its 
content. 
 Non-User-Initiated Video and Audio: The ad automatically plays video and audio.  
 Interstitial: The ad is displayed before the intended destination page loads. 
 Non-User-Initiated Background Music: The ad automatically plays background music.  
 Full Page Banner Ad: The ad occupies the space of a typical computer screen. 
 Interactive: The ad requests two-way communication with its user.  
                                                 
4 Our data have detailed information about the categories but, to protect client privacy, the firm that gave us access 
to the data did not give us information on which specific advertisers sponsored particular campaigns and which 
specific websites displayed the campaigns. 
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 Floating Ad: The ad is not user-initiated, is superimposed over a user-requested page, and 
disappears or becomes unobtrusive after a specific time period (typically 5-30 seconds). 
As indicated in Table 1a, 48 percent of campaigns used high-visibility ads. Of these ads, the 
largest sub-group was interactive ads, which comprised 17 percent of all ads. Pop-Under ads 
were the least common, representing less than 0.1 percent of all ads. In Table 3, we check the 
robustness of our results to our definition of high visibility. 
Table 1a: Summary Statistics at the respondent level 
 Mean Std Dev Min Max Observations 
Likely to purchase 0.20 0.40 0 1 2464812+ 
Saw Ad 0.26 0.44 0 1 2481592+ 
Exposed (Treatment) 0.34++ 0.47 0 1 2802333 
Context Ad 0.10 0.30 0 1 2802333 
High Visibility Ad 0.49 0.50 0 1 2802333 
Female 0.53 9.49 0 1 2802333 
Income 62,760 55,248 15,000 250,000 2019996 
Age 40.9 15.6 10 100 2744149 
Internet Hours 13.4 10.2 1 31 1853893 
+A small fraction of respondents answered two out of the three questions on the measures we use as dependent variables. 
Therefore, the sample size varies slightly across variables. 
++In our main specifications, we exclude observations where the random operation of the ad server meant that the respondent had 
been exposed to the ad multiple times. If we include these observations, the proportion of exposed to non-exposed is close to 50 
percent. We confirm robustness to these excluded observations in Table 3. 
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Table 1b: Summary Statistics at the survey-site level 
Variable Mean Std 
Dev 
Min Max Observations 
# of Subjects 198 275.1 8 8456 13121 
Context Ad 0.13 0.34 0 1 13121 
High Visibility Ad 0.50 0.50 0 1 13121 
Difference in Purchase Intent between exposed & control 0.0083 0.15 -1 1 10468 
Difference in Favorable Opinion between exposed & control 0.0100 0.16 -1 1 10362 
Difference in intent-scale between exposed & control 0.040 0.54 -4 4 10468 
Difference in opinion-scale between exposed & control 0.036 0.41 -3.67 4 10362 
Difference in Ad Recall between exposed & control 0.046 0.18 -1 1 10750 
Campaign increased Purchase Intent 0.60 0.49 0 1 13121 
Campaign increased Favorable Intent 0.61 0.49 0 1 13121 
Campaign increased Intent-Scale 0.64 0.48 0 1 13121 
Campaign increased Opinion-Scale 0.65 0.48 0 1 13121 
Campaign increased Ad Recall 0.70 0.46 0 1 13121 
Campaign increased Ad Recall but not Purchase Intent 0.23 0.42 0 1 13121 
Campaign increased Purchase Intent but not Ad Recall 0.13 0.11 0 1 13121 
 
Table 1b presents some summary statistics at the level of the survey-site. Two things are 
immediately apparent. First, in general the effect of exposure to a banner ad is small. On average, 
exposure shifts the proportion of people stating they are very likely to make a purchase by less 
than 1%. Ad exposure increases the number of people who can actually recall seeing the ad by 
only 5%. Only 60% of campaigns generated an improvement in purchase intent, while 70% 
increased ad recall. 23% of campaigns generate ad recall but do not increase stated purchase 
intent, and 13% of campaigns are associated with an increase in purchase intent but not ad recall. 
Perhaps this lack of impact is unsurprising given that we are assessing whether seeing a banner 
ad once changes intended behavior. What really matters is whether this small change in intended 
behavior is worth the price paid (0.2 cents per view according to Khan 2009). 
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3. Methods 
Our estimation strategy builds an effectiveness function for the individual ads. We focus 
on two aspects of online advertising: visibility and contextual targeting.5 Specifically, assume the 
effectiveness of a campaign c (defined as a particular advertisement shown on a particular 
website) to individual j is: 
 
For estimation, we convert this effectiveness function for viewer j into a linear model of 
visibility and targeting which allows for some idiosyncratic features of the advertisement-
website pair ( ) and some idiosyncratic characteristics of the viewer ( . As in any research 
which estimates a response function, there is a concern here that viewer characteristics may be 
systematically correlated with the propensity to view contextually-targeted or highly visible ads 
(see Levinsohn and Petrin 2003 for a discussion in the context of production functions). The 
randomized nature of our data means that we can address this by measuring the difference 
between the exposed group and a control group of respondents who did not see the ad. 
Substituting our measure of effectiveness (purchase intent) and adding a control for potential 
demographic differences between the treatment and control groups, we estimate the effect of 
being exposed to the ad using the following difference-in-difference equation: 
 
 
                                                 
5 Of course, there are many features of the ad, the viewer, and the website that may influence advertising 
effectiveness but are not the primary focus on this study. Our analysis controls for these through the randomization 
of the exposed condition, the campaign-specific fixed effects, and the viewer characteristics. 
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Where  represents a vector of demographic controls (specifically, an indicator variable 
for whether the respondent is female and mean-standardized measures for age, income, and time 
spent online),  represents the campaign (advertisement-website) fixed effects that control for 
any differences in purchase intent across products and websites, and  is an idiosyncratic error 
term. The fixed effects capture the main effects (i.e. those that affect both the exposed and 
control groups) of context, visibility, and the interaction between context and visibility as well as 
heterogeneity in the response to different campaigns. Whether context and visibility are 
substitutes or complements is captured by the coefficient . This equation can be interpreted as a 
reduced-form effectiveness function for advertising, in which the advertising produces purchase 
intent (our proxy for effectiveness).  
In the main specifications in this paper, we use as our main dependent variable 
(“ ”) whether the survey-taker reported the highest score on the scale ("Very Likely to 
Make a Purchase"). As reported in our summary statistics (Table 1a), on average one-fifth of 
respondents responded with an answer at the top of the scale. We discretize in this manner to 
avoid generating means from an ordinal scale (e.g. Malhotra 2007; Aaker, Kumar, and Day 
2004). Nevertheless, we recognize that whether such scales should be treated as continuous is a 
gray area in marketing practice (discussed by, e.g., Fink 2009, p. 26). Bentler and Chou (1987), 
while acknowledging that such scales are ordinal, argue that it is common practice to treat them 
as continuous variables because it makes little practical difference. Johnson and Creech (1983) 
come to a similar conclusion. In addition, many researchers argue that properly-designed scales 
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are in fact interval scales not ordinal scales (see Kline 2005 for a discussion). Some recent 
empirical research in marketing (e.g. Godes and Mayzlin 2009) has followed this interpretation 
and has treated ratings scales as interval scales. For these reasons, we have replicated all of our 
results in the appendix, treating the dependent variable as a continuous measure based on the 
full-scale responses. We show that this makes no practical difference. 
Another issue from using purchase intention as our dependent variable is that it is a 
weaker measure of advertising success than purchasing or profitability (as used by Lewis and 
Reiley 2009 and others), because many users may claim that they intend to purchase but never 
do so. For our purposes, as long as people reporting higher purchase intent are actually more 
likely to purchase (and the treatment group is truly random), our conclusions about the 
directionality of the relationship between contextual targeting, high visibility, and effectiveness 
will hold. This positive correlation has been well established in work such as Bemmaor (1995), 
and in particular has been found to be higher for product-specific surveys such as the ones 
conducted in our data than for category-level studies (Morwitz, Steckel, and Gupta 2007). 
However, we do not know whether the relative size or relative significance of the results changes 
for actual purchase behavior.  
Our estimation procedure is straightforward because of the randomized nature of the data 
collection. We have an experiment-like setting, with a treatment group who were exposed to the 
ads and a control group who were not. We compare these groups' purchase intent, and explore 
whether the difference between the exposed and control groups is related to the visibility of an ad 
and whether the ad's content matches the website content. We then explore how purchase intent 
relates to ads that are both highly visible and targeted to the content. Our core regressions are run 
using Stata’s commands for linear regression with panel data. To adjust for intra-website and 
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campaign correlation between respondents, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are 
clustered at the website-campaign level using Stata’s “cluster” function. Generally, our method 
follows the framework for causal econometric analysis provided in Angrist and Pischke (2009). 
 We report our main results using a linear probability model where the coefficients are 
calculated using ordinary least squares, though we show robustness to a logit formulation. We 
primarily use a linear probability model because it makes it feasible to estimate a model with 
over ten thousand campaign-website fixed effects using the full data set of nearly 2.5 million 
observations, whereas computational limitations prevent us from estimating a logit model with 
the full data. The large number of observations in our data means that inefficiency—a potential 
weakness of the linear probability model relative to probit and logit—is not a major concern in 
our setting. Angrist and Pischke (2009) point out that this increased computational efficiency 
comes at little practical cost. They show that in several empirical applications, there is little 
difference between the marginal effects estimated with limited dependent variables models and 
linear probability models.  
 One major concern about using the linear probability model, which is the potential for 
biased estimates and predicted probabilities outside the range of 0 and 1 (see Horrace and 
Oaxaca 2006 for a discussion), is less likely in our setting because the mass point of dependent 
variable is far from 0 or 1 and because our covariates are almost all binary variables. Indeed, all 
predicted probabilities in our model for purchase intent lie between 0.137 and 0.256. Combined 
with its computational advantages, this suggests that the benefits of using a linear probability 
model as our primary estimation technique outweigh the costs.  
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4. Results 
4.1 The effect of combining highly visible and contextually-targeted ads 
Column (1) of Table 2 reports our key results, where we include an interaction between 
contextual targeting and high visibility. The main effect of exposure and the additional effects of 
contextual targeting and high visibility of ads are all positive. Contextual targeting seems to have 
a slightly larger marginal effect than high visibility. The crucial result is the interaction term 
between exposure, contextual targeting, and high visibility. It is negative and significant. This 
suggests that firm investments in contextual targeting and highly visible ads are substitutes. A 
Wald test suggests that high-visibility ads on contextually-targeted sites perform worse than ads 
that are not highly visible (p-value=0.001, F-stat 10.83). The respondent-level controls indicate 
that younger, female respondents who have lower incomes and spend more time on the internet 
are more likely to say they will buy the product.  
In columns (2)-(4) we present some evidence that reflects what a manager would 
conclude if they evaluated the incremental benefit of targeting or using high visibility ads 
independently. Column (2) reports results that allow the effect of exposure to be moderated by 
whether or not the website matched the product. We find a positive moderating effect of 
contextual targeting. That is, for campaigns where the website matches the product, there is an 
incremental positive effect from exposure that represents a 70% increase from the base positive 
effect of exposure. However, it is noticeable that without the controls for visibility that we 
included in column (1), we measure the effect of contextual targeting less precisely. Column (3) 
reports results that allow the effect of exposure to be moderated by whether the ad was high-
visibility or not. We find a positive moderating effect of visibility on likelihood of purchase. 
Having a high-visibility ad almost doubles the effect of exposure on the proportion of 
respondents who report themselves very likely to purchase. Column (4) measures the mean effect 
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of exposure. The coefficient suggests that exposure to a single ad, relative to a mean of 0.20, 
increases purchase intent by 3.6%. This gives us a baseline that reflects the typical metric that 
advertisers use when evaluating the success of a campaign (or lack of it), which we use in our 
calculations of the economic importance of our results.  
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Table 2: Influence of High Visibility and Contextual Targeting on Purchase Intent 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
p-value Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
p-value Coefficient 
 (Std. Error) 
p-value Coefficient 
 (Std. Error) 
p-value
Exposed 0.00473*** 
(0.00110) 
0.000 0.00565
***
(0.00104) 
0.000 0.00705
*** 
(0.000814) 
0.000 0.00745
*** 
(0.000759) 
0.000
         
Exposed × Context Ad 0.00941*** 
(0.00292) 
0.001  
 
 0.00384
* 
(0.00215) 
0.073  
 
 
         
Exposed × High Visibility Ad 0.00547*** 
(0.00161) 
0.001 0.00421
***
(0.00150) 
0.005  
 
  
 
 
         
Exposed × Context Ad × 
 High Visibility Ad 
-0.0124*** 
(0.00428) 
0.004  
 
  
 
  
 
 
         
Female 0.0116*** 
(0.00119) 
0.000 0.0116
*** 
(0.00119) 
0.000 0.0116
*** 
(0.00119) 
0.000 0.0116
*** 
(0.00119) 
0.000
Hours on Internet (standardized) 0.0113*** 
(0.000344) 
0.000 0.0113
*** 
(0.000344) 
0.000 0.0113
*** 
(0.000344) 
0.000 0.0113
*** 
(0.000344) 
0.000
Income (Standardized)  -0.00194*** 
(0.000406) 
0.000 -0.00194
***
(0.000406) 
0.000 -0.00194
*** 
(0.000407) 
0.000 -0.00194
*** 
(0.000407) 
0.000
Age (Standardized) -0.00957*** 
(0.000568) 
0.000 -0.00957
***
(0.000569) 
0.000 -0.00957
*** 
(0.000569) 
0.000 -0.00957
*** 
(0.000569) 
0.000
Observations 2464812 2464812 2464812 2464812 
Log-Likelihood -1062349 -1062357 -1062361 -1062363 
Variance captured by Fixed Effects 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.139 
R-Squared 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141 
Fixed effects at ad-site level; Robust standard errors clustered at ad-site level, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
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The fit of these regressions (measured by R-squared) is 0.141, with little difference across 
the four specifications. Given heterogeneous tastes for the products being advertised, we do not 
view the overall level of fit as surprising. Furthermore, most of this is explained by the fixed 
effects, with just 0.002 explained by our covariates for ad exposure and type. Again, we do not 
view it as surprising that seeing a banner ad once explains only a small fraction of the variance in 
purchase intent for the product. If it explained much more, we would expect the price of such 
advertisements to be much larger than 0.2 cents per view. Nevertheless, as we detail in section 
4.3 below, our estimates still have important economic implications for the online advertising 
industry. It is not overall fit at the individual level that matters, but the marginal benefit relative 
to the marginal cost.  
4.2 Robustness Checks 
We checked the robustness of the negative interaction effect that we find in column (4) of 
Table 2 to many alternative specifications. Table 3 displays the results. Column (1) shows a logit 
specification to check that our linear probability specification had not influenced the results. 
Limitations of computing power meant that we had to take a 5% sample of the original data in 
order to be able to estimate a logit specification with the full set of fixed effects. Even with this 
smaller sample, the results are similar in relative size and magnitude.  
One issue of a logit probability model compared to a linear probability model is that the 
interpretation of interaction terms in logit and probit models is not straightforward (Ai and 
Norton 2003), as they are a cross-derivative of the expected value of the dependent variable. 
Specifically, for any nonlinear model where 
, Ai and Norton point out that the 
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interaction effect is the cross-derivative of the expected value of y: 
. The sign of this marginal effect is 
not necessarily the same as the sign of the coefficient . We therefore used the appropriate 
formula for three-way interactions to calculate the marginal effect in this setting. The marginal 
effects at the means of the estimation sample were 0.008 (p-value=0.312) for Exposed × Context 
Ad; 0.010 (p-value=0.015) for Exposed × High Visibility Ad; and -0.037 (p-value=0.024) for 
Exposed × Context Ad × High Visibility Ad. These estimates for our key interaction and the 
effect of visibility were therefore larger than those reported in Table 1, though the coefficient 
estimate for contextual targeting is no longer significant. This robustness check strongly supports 
our core finding that contextually targeted ads that are highly visible are less effective than ads 
that are either contextually targeted or highly visible but not both. 
We also use the logit results to conduct an out-of-sample prediction on the remaining 
95% of the data. Our model correctly predicts 61.4% of successful campaigns (defined as ad 
campaigns on a specific website where the average purchase intent for the treatment group is 
higher than the control group). This is significantly better than the 52% of successful campaigns 
that we would predict by chance using random assignment.6 
In column (2), we use the full (1 to 5) scale of the dependent variable rather than 
discretizing it. Our results are robust. In the appendix, we show robustness of all results to this 
specification. In column (3), we show that our results do not change if we exclude demographic 
controls for gender, age, income, and internet usage. This provides supporting evidence that the 
experiment randomized the treatment between such groups and that unobserved heterogeneity 
                                                 
6 Since about 60% of campaigns are successful, the hit rate under random assignment is 52%, i.e., (40% x 40%) + (60% x 60%.) 
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between control and exposed groups does not drive our results. Column (4) shows robustness to 
a non-parametric specification for the gender, age, income, and internet usage controls, where we 
include a different fixed effect for different values for age, income, and internet usage. This also 
allows us to include fixed effects for missing values or intentionally non-reported values of these 
controls.  
In column (5), we see whether our results are echoed in another measure of ad 
effectiveness: Whether or not the respondent expressed a favorable opinion of the product. The 
results in column (5) are similar to those previously reported, though the point estimate for the 
effect of a contextually-targeted ad is slightly smaller. This may be because contextually-targeted 
advertising is more successful at influencing intended actions than at influencing opinions (Rutz 
and Bucklin 2009). In column (6), we show that our results are robust to our definition of ad 
visibility. One concern with including pop-up ads is the development of pop-up blockers as a 
feature of internet browsers. This could influence our results, for example, if people who 
browsed sites with specific content were more likely to have pop-up blockers. However, the 
results in column (6) show the same pattern as before, even when we exclude such ads.  
In Table 3 in column (7), we report results for all respondents, including those who due to 
the randomized nature of the ad server saw the ad more than once. We excluded these 730,000 
respondents from the data we use to report our main specifications in order to simplify 
interpretation of what ‘exposed’ means in our setting. The results are similar to before, though 
the effect of baseline exposure is slightly higher.  
 
  
Table 3: Robustness Checks  
Dependent Variable: Respondent very likely to purchase 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Logit+ Use full 
scale—i.e. 
treat rating 
scale as 
interval 
No Controls Non-
Parametric 
Controls 
Favorable 
Opinion 
No Pop-Ups Multiply 
Treated 
Only ads that 
appear on both 
matched and 
unmatched 
context websites 
Exposed 0.0788*** 
(0.0268) 
0.0220*** 
(0.00512) 
0.00492*** 
(0.00107) 
0.00513***
(0.00112) 
0.00573*** 
(0.00103) 
0.00479*** 
(0.00110) 
0.00582***
(0.000983) 
0.00451*** 
(0.00107) 
         
Exposed × Context 0.177** 
(0.0863) 
0.0455*** 
(0.0109) 
0.00931*** 
(0.00290) 
0.00948***
(0.00293) 
0.00623** 
(0.00302) 
0.00921*** 
(0.00290) 
0.0106***
(0.00282) 
0.0102*** 
(0.00330) 
         
Exposed × High Visibility 0.0861** 
(0.0401) 
0.0263*** 
(0.00679) 
0.00566*** 
(0.00159) 
0.00534***
(0.00161) 
0.00579*** 
(0.00160) 
0.00536*** 
(0.00161) 
0.00514***
(0.00143) 
0.00510*** 
(0.00163) 
         
Exposed × Context × 
High Visibility  
-0.365*** 
(0.125) 
-0.0560*** 
(0.0163) 
-0.0125*** 
(0.00427) 
-0.0123***
(0.00428) 
-0.0118*** 
(0.00451) 
-0.0120*** 
(0.00428) 
-0.0130***
(0.00395) 
-0.0144*** 
(0.00471) 
         
Female 0.0612*** 
(0.0196) 
0.0146*** 
(0.00519) 
 
 
 
 
0.0136*** 
(0.00116) 
0.0116*** 
(0.00119) 
0.0117***
(0.00111) 
0.0118*** 
(0.00112) 
Hours on Internet 
(standardized) 
0.0763*** 
(0.00964) 
0.0414*** 
(0.00123) 
 
 
 
 
0.0126*** 
(0.000375) 
0.0113*** 
(0.000344) 
0.0110***
(0.000319) 
0.0112*** 
(0.000366) 
Income (standardized) -0.0253** 
(0.0100) 
-0.0366*** 
(0.00169) 
 
 
 
 
-0.00170*** 
(0.000476) 
-0.00194*** 
(0.000406) 
-0.00150***
(0.000372)
-0.00199*** 
(0.000439) 
Age (standardized) -0.0671*** 
(0.00952) 
-0.0880*** 
(0.00259) 
 
 
 
 
-0.00435*** 
(0.000605) 
-0.00957*** 
(0.000568) 
-0.00893***
(0.000557)
-0.00957*** 
(0.000569) 
Age, Income, Internet Use 
Fixed Effects  
No No No Yes No No No No 
Observations 102414 2464812 2464812 2464812 2443939 2464812 3196474 1943489 
Log-Likelihood -40251.8 -4167674.1 -1063992.6 -1061035.0 -1193844.2 -1062349.5 -1380581.9 -856614.7 
R-Squared N/A 0.200 0.140 0.142 0.136 0.141 0.142 0.140 
Fixed effects at ad-site level; Robust standard errors, clustered at ad-site level, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
+Based on a 5% sample of data to overcome computational limitations imposed by estimating fixed 13,000 fixed effects. 
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While the individual-level randomization of exposure to ads addresses the usual concerns 
about unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level, our result for this negative interaction 
between high visibility and contextual targeting relies on the assumption that contextually-
targeted highly visible ads are not of worse quality than either highly visible ads that are not 
contextually-targeted or contextually-targeted ads that are not highly visible. This therefore 
assumes that the endogeneity of advertising quality will not systematically affect our core result. 
In Table 3 column (8), we explore the appropriateness of this assumption in our context. We look 
only at ads that were run on more than one website and where the websites sometimes were 
contextually targeted and sometimes not. Our core results do not change. Therefore, holding 
campaign quality fixed, we still observe substitution between visibility and contextual targeting. 
4.3 Economic implications 
Section 4.2 establishes that our results are statistically robust to many specifications, but 
we have yet not established that they are economically meaningful. First, we note that column 
(1) of Table 2 suggests that seeing one plain banner ad once increases purchase intention by 
0.473 percentage points. Relative to a price of 0.2 cents per view, this means that online 
advertising pays off if increasing purchase intention to “very likely to purchase” is worth 42 
cents to the firm (95% confidence interval 29 to 78 cents). Therefore, while the coefficient may 
seem small, it suggests an economically important impact of online advertising. The effects of 
targeted ads and obtrusive ads are even larger, though the prices of such ads are also higher. 
We combine information from our data with various industry sources to develop “back-
of-the-envelope” calculations on the total magnitude of wasted advertising spending due to ads 
that are both targeted and obtrusive. These estimates are all clearly rough; the purpose of this 
subsection is simply to give a sense of the order of magnitude of the importance of our results. 
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In order to conduct this calculation, we require estimates of (a) the total size of online 
display advertising spending, (b) the percentage of these campaigns that are both targeted and 
obtrusive, (c) the cost of the targeted and obtrusive ads relative to plain banner ads, and (d) the 
effectiveness of targeted and obtrusive ads relative to plain banner ads.  
For (a) "total ad spending", we use Khan (2009)'s estimate that US firms spent $8.3 
billion on online display advertising in 2009. For (b), we rely on the fact that in the data we study 
6.4% of the campaigns are both targeted and obtrusive. Our dataset is the most commonly used 
source in industry for information on trends in online display advertising. For (c), we use our 
results on the relative effectiveness of plain banner ads and targeted and obtrusive ads in 
columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 to derive estimates of their relative costs. We use these estimates 
rather than actual industry costs because estimates vary widely about the relative cost of different 
types of ads (as do the list prices websites provide to advertisers).7 Our estimates suggest that 
advertisers should pay 74% more for high visibility ads (95% confidence interval 16%-197%) 
and 54% (95% confidence interval -6%-147%) more for context-based ads. We conservatively 
assume that ads that are both targeted and highly visible have the same premium as highly visible 
ads (74%) relative to plain banner ads.8 For (d), we use our estimates from Table 2 to generate 
the relative effectiveness of targeted and obtrusive ads relative to plain banner ads.  
Combining these data suggests that 8% (95% confidence interval 7.9-9.2%) of total ad 
spending, or $664 million, is being spent on campaigns that combine high visibility and 
                                                 
7 For example, Khan (2009) estimates the typical cost of a plain banner ad at $2 per 1000 impressions or 0.2 cents 
per impression in 2009. Targeted ads and visible ads can cost much more. Confidential estimates from a large media 
company report that banner prices on web properties that allow contextual targeting are priced 10 times higher than 
regular “run of the network” ads (Krauss et al 2008). Similarly, there are industry reports that basic video ads cost 
four times as much as regular ads; premium ads cost as much as 18 times regular banner ads (Palumbo 2009).  
8 Advertisers appear to pay a premium for ads that are both contextually targeted and highly visible. For example, 
technologyreview.com, a website owned by MIT to distribute its research on technology, charges a price that is 
already 35 times higher than average for 1000 impressions because it can attract technology advertisers who want to 
advertise to technology professionals. Then, it charges a further 50% premium for advertisers who want to use video 
or audio ads. 
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targeting. Because these ads are no more effective than standard banners, if advertisers replaced 
redundantly targeted and visible ads with cheaper standard banner ads they could cut ad spending 
by 5.3 percent (95% confidence interval 3.5%-7.4%) without affecting ad performance.  
There are some obvious caveats to the validity of this number. Using the estimates in 
Table 2 to calculate (c), the implied price premiums have the advantage of allowing us to provide 
a range of statistical confidence, but these estimated price premiums are likely too low given 
posted industry prices. Therefore, it is likely that we understate the cost savings. Second, while 
our data are collected by a major advertising company on behalf of its clients and are the one of 
the most used data sources for evaluating campaign performance in industry, it is not certain that 
they are representative of the display advertising sector in general when we use these data to 
project the fraction of campaigns that are targeted and obtrusive. This could bias the results in 
either direction. Therefore, despite reporting confidence intervals, validity concerns may 
overwhelm the reliability measures.  
4.4 Underlying Mechanism 
Having established the robustness of the result, we then explore the underlying 
mechanism. We first rule out differences in ad recall. Specifically, one potential explanation for 
why highly visible ads and contextually-targeted ads work poorly together is that highly visible 
ads are less successful at distinguishing themselves if they appear next to similar content. For 
example, a non-user-initiated video ad that is placed on a movie website may be less noticeable 
there than if it is placed on a cooking site.  
Table 4 reports the results of a specification similar to that in Table 2, but where the 
dependent variable is whether or not the survey respondent said they could recall seeing the ad 
on the website. Column (1) suggests that the effect of being exposed to the ad is larger for this 
26 
 
 
 
measure than in Table 2. This is unsurprising, as the effect is more direct; there is a 20 percent 
increase from the baseline proportion remembering seeing the ad for people who saw the ad, as 
compared to those who did not. Column (2) suggests that if an ad's content matches the website's 
content, it is less likely to be recalled. So, contextually-targeted ads are associated with higher 
purchase intent for the product, but people who see contextually-targeted ads are less likely to 
recall those ads than are people who see other kinds of ads. This is consistent with findings in the 
product placement literature (Russell 2002) that contextually appropriate ads can blend into the 
content, reducing recall but increasing purchase intent. Column (3) is consistent with our prior 
results: Visible ads are more likely to be recalled. Column (4) suggests that there is no significant 
negative interaction between contextual targeting and high visibility for recall.  
The difference in these results from Table 2 suggests that the combination of high 
visibility and contextual targeting does not predominantly affect recall, but instead affects how 
effective the ad is at persuading the consumer to change their purchase intent. Indeed, making 
contextually-targeted ads too ‘visible’ seems to drive a wedge between the advertiser and the 
consumer. One interpretation of this result is that contextually-targeted ads are not as directly 
noticeable, and hence are viewed more favorably as background information; however, when 
contextually-targeted ads are highly visible, they no longer blend into the underlying website. 
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Table 4: Influence of High Visibility and Contextual Targeting on Ad Recall 
Dependent Variable: Respondent recalls seeing the advertisement 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exposed 0.0458*** 
(0.00116) 
0.0465*** 
(0.00126) 
0.0410*** 
(0.00160) 
0.0412*** 
(0.00173) 
     
Exposed × Context  
 
-0.00665** 
(0.00298) 
 
 
-0.00219 
(0.00409) 
     
Exposed × 
High Visibility 
 
 
 
 
0.0104*** 
(0.00233) 
0.0115*** 
(0.00253) 
     
Exposed × Context × 
High Visibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.00972 
(0.00597) 
     
Female -0.0230*** 
(0.00114) 
-0.0230*** 
(0.00114) 
-0.0230*** 
(0.00114) 
-0.0230*** 
(0.00114) 
Hours on Internet 
(standardized) 
0.0230*** 
(0.000425) 
0.0230*** 
(0.000425) 
0.0230*** 
(0.000425) 
0.0230*** 
(0.000425) 
Income (standardized) -0.00260*** 
(0.000427) 
-0.00260*** 
(0.000427) 
-0.00260*** 
(0.000427) 
-0.00260*** 
(0.000427) 
Age (standardized) -0.0131*** 
(0.000586) 
-0.0131*** 
(0.000588) 
-0.0131*** 
(0.000586) 
-0.0131*** 
(0.000588) 
     
Observations 2481592 2481592 2481592 2481592 
Log-Likelihood -1307660.5 -1307699.2 -1307704.8 -1307660.5 
R-Squared 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 
Fixed effects at ad-site level; Robust standard errors, clustered at ad-site level, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
We next explore what drives the negative interaction between contextual targeting and 
high visibility when purchase intent is the dependent variable. We show that privacy is an 
important moderator, both in terms of whether the respondent is particularly sensitive to intrusive 
behavior, and in terms of the nature of the product itself. This is consistent with highly visible 
ads increasing consumer inferences of manipulative intent in targeted advertising (Campbell 
1995; Friestad and Wright 1994; Kirmani and Zhu 2007). 
We stratify our results by whether or not the respondent checked the box “I prefer not to 
answer that question” when asked about income. As documented by Turrell (2000), people who 
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refuse to answer questions on income usually do so because of concerns about privacy. A 
comparison between column (1) and column (2) of Table 5 shows that survey respondents who 
do not respond to an intrusive question also display stronger substitution between contextually-
targeted and highly visible ads than other respondents. When contextual targeting is highly 
visible, these respondents react negatively to the ads. Interestingly, privacy-minded people do 
not react differently than others to ads that are highly visible or contextually-targeted but not 
both. The estimates in column (2) suggest that these privacy-minded people respond positively to 
high visibility ads so long as they are not also contextually-targeted. To assess the relative 
significance of the estimates in these two columns, we also ran a specification where we pooled 
the sample and included a four-way interaction between Exposed × Context Ad × High Visibility 
and whether the person kept their income secret. The results are reported in full in Table A4. 
This four-way interaction suggested that indeed there was a large and statistically significant 
additional negative interaction for customers who kept their income secret.  
 In columns (3) through (6), we explored whether this potential role for intrusiveness as 
an underlying mechanism was also echoed in the kind of products that were advertised. We 
looked to see whether the effect was stronger or weaker in categories which are generally 
considered to be personal or private. 
  
Table 5: Privacy-sensitivity is associated with stronger substitution between contextual targeting and high visibility  
Dependent Variable: Respondent very likely to purchase 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Does not 
Reveal 
Income 
Reveals 
Income 
Private Not Private Health CPG Other CPG 
Exposed 0.00391* 
(0.00206) 
0.00505*** 
(0.00116) 
0.00184 
(0.00288) 
0.00517*** 
(0.00119) 
-0.00480 
(0.00522) 
0.00840** 
(0.00344) 
       
Exposed × Context 0.0102 
(0.00669) 
0.00916*** 
(0.00311) 
0.0135** 
(0.00561) 
0.00857** 
(0.00344) 
0.0423*** 
(0.0100) 
0.0135 
(0.0138) 
       
Exposed × High Visibility 0.00643** 
(0.00328) 
0.00502*** 
(0.00168) 
0.0102** 
(0.00464) 
0.00480*** 
(0.00172) 
0.0177** 
(0.00795) 
0.0108** 
(0.00517) 
       
Exposed × Context × 
High Visibility 
-0.0214** 
(0.00932) 
-0.0101** 
(0.00466) 
-0.0274*** 
(0.00968) 
-0.00979** 
(0.00484) 
-0.0788*** 
(0.0186) 
-0.0168 
(0.0181) 
       
Female 0.0128*** 
(0.00181) 
0.0123*** 
(0.00124) 
0.00922** 
(0.00367) 
0.0119*** 
(0.00125) 
0.0343*** 
(0.00641) 
0.0652*** 
(0.00419) 
Hours on Internet 
(standardized) 
0.00750*** 
(0.000716) 
0.0119*** 
(0.000376) 
0.0101*** 
(0.000946) 
0.0115*** 
(0.000369) 
0.0125*** 
(0.00160) 
0.0138*** 
(0.00124) 
Income (standardized) N/A 
 
-0.00181***
(0.000407) 
-0.00126 
(0.000944) 
-0.00201*** 
(0.000444) 
-0.00609*** 
(0.00166) 
-0.00644*** 
(0.00142) 
Age (standardized) -0.0112*** 
(0.000916) 
-0.00910***
(0.000568) 
-0.0120*** 
(0.00146) 
-0.00923*** 
(0.000615) 
-0.0195*** 
(0.00280) 
0.00196 
(0.00239) 
Coefficient on four-way 
interaction in alternative 
specification 
-0.0369*** 
(0.00919) 
-0.0183* 
(0.0109) 
-0.0677*** 
(0.0258) 
Observations 390608 2074204 325376 2139436 114922 192609 
Log-Likelihood -152023.4 -903402.0 -119800.1 -941137.4 -57285.5 -102271.0 
R-Squared 0.157 0.143 0.145 0.139 0.139 0.146 
Fixed effects at ad-site level; Robust standard errors, clustered at ad-site level, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Full results for four-way interaction 
specification on pooled data used to assess significance reported in Table A4. 
  
In columns (3) and (4), we looked across all categories and identified several that are 
clearly related to privacy. Specifically, these categories are Banking, Health, Health Services, 
OTC Medications, Insurance, Investment, Mutual Funds, Retirement Funds, Loans, and Other 
Financial Services. We identified health and financial products as categories where there may be 
privacy concerns on the basis of two factors. First, Tsai et al (2010) offer survey evidence of 
customers about which products they considered private, and confirm that health and financial 
information are categories where privacy is particularly important. Second, actual privacy 
policies tend to specify health and financial products as privacy-related. For example, Google’s 
privacy policy states that “Google will not associate sensitive interest categories with your 
browser (such as those based on race, religion, sexual orientation, health, or sensitive financial 
categories), and will not use such categories when showing you interest-based ads.” Column (3) 
includes the categories where privacy concerns are readily apparent; column (4) includes all 
others. Substitution between visibility and contextual targeting is highest for categories related to 
privacy. We estimated a four-way interaction specification that indicated that this incremental 
negative effect is significant at the 10% level. 
As noted in the information security and privacy literature (e.g. Kumaraguru and 
Cranor’s (2005) extensive survey results), consumers consider health information and use of 
medications to be especially personal information, and something that should be protected 
online. This is also echoed in the special protections given to health information in the European 
Union data privacy law 2002/EC/58. In columns (5) and (6), we focus on health and look for 
differences within a single category, in order to compare health-related products to other similar 
products. Specifically, we compare estimates for over-the-counter medications to food-based 
consumer packaged goods categories. The results again suggest that the substitution between 
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contextual targeting and high visibility was significantly larger for the privacy-related products. 
The incremental negative effect is evaluated to be significant at the 1% level in a four-way 
interaction specification.  
 
5. Interpretation and Conclusion 
Our study of 2,892 online display advertising campaigns across a variety of categories 
and website yields three core conclusions:  
First, we find that while obtrusive (or highly visible) online advertising and context-based 
online advertising work relatively well independently, they appear to fail when combined. This 
result is more pronounced in categories of products likely to be more private, and for people who 
seem to guard their privacy more closely. This suggests that the ineffectiveness of combining 
contextual targeting and obtrusiveness in advertising is driven by consumers’ perceptions of 
privacy. Consumers may be willing to tolerate contextually-targeted ads more than other ads 
because they potentially provide information; however, making such ads obtrusive in nature may 
increase perceptions of manipulation (Campbell 1995). When privacy concerns are salient, a 
prevention focus may increase sensitivity to manipulative intent of the targeted ads (Kirmani and 
Zhu 2007). This suggests a role for privacy concerns in models that optimize advertising content 
in data-rich environments by minimizing viewer avoidance (e.g. Kempe and Wilbur 2009).  
Second, the result that contextually-targeted ads work at least as well if they do not have 
features designed to enhance their visibility can help to explain the unexpected success of 
products such as AdSense by Google. It also explains why online advertising is becoming 
increasingly divided between plain text-based highly targeted ads, and more visually striking but 
less targeted ads. The results also suggest more generally the importance of more nuanced 
empirical models for advertising success. Not only is it important to separately model how ads 
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affect awareness and preferences, but is also important to include controls for the features and 
placement of ads in such specifications.  
Third, our findings on privacy and intrusiveness have policy implications for the direction 
of government policy. There is mounting pressure in the US and Europe to regulate the use of 
data on browsing behavior to target advertising (Shatz 2009). Our research suggests that 
regulators may need to consider a potential trade-off from such regulation. If regulation is 
successful at reducing the amount of targeting that a firm can do by using a customer’s browsing 
behavior, then firms may find it optimal to invest instead in highly obtrusive ads. Customers may 
dislike having data collected about their browsing behavior, but they have also expressed dislike 
of highly visible ads in surveys (Chan, Dobb, and Stevens 2004). Therefore, regulators should 
weigh these two potential sources of customer resistance towards advertising against each other.  
As with any empirical work, this paper has a number of limitations which present 
opportunities for future research. First, we rely on stated expressions of purchase intent and not 
actual purchase data. It is possible that the type of advertising used may have a different effect on 
actual purchases. Second, we present evidence that suggests that the negative effect of 
combining both visibility and targeting is more pronounced in situations where privacy is 
important, but there are still further questions about what other triggers of privacy concerns there 
may be for ad viewers. In general in academic marketing research, there have been few studies 
about how customer privacy concerns are triggered and what the implications are for firms. This 
study highlights the need for a better understanding of the behavioral processes that generate 
consumer privacy concerns. Third, we look only at targeting of ads based on the customer's 
current website browsing patterns. We do not look at reactions to ads that are targeted on the 
basis of past browsing behavior, though these ads have become very controversial in recent 
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discussions at the Federal Communications Commission. Given the growing commercial 
importance of behavioral targeting, this is an area where academic research could potentially 
help answer questions both about the usefulness of such ads and how customer perceive and 
react to being targeted by ads in this way. 
More generally, we think there are several promising avenues for research to build on our 
findings. First, while there is a formal theoretical literature that discusses behavioral targeting of 
pricing and its implications for privacy (e.g. Acquisti and Varian 2005; Chen, Narasimhan, and 
Zhang 2001; Fudenberg and Villas-Boas 2006; Hermalin and Katz 2006; Hui and Png 2006), the 
literature on behavioral targeting of advertising remains sparse. What are the benefits of such 
targeting? What are the costs? How can we formalize the concept of privacy in the context of 
behaviorally targeted advertising? Second, it would be interesting to explore how our findings on 
privacy apply to websites where visitors reveal detailed personal information, such as social 
networking websites. Are visitors to such sites more aware of manipulation attempts? Is there a 
way to leverage the social network and overcome perceptions of manipulative intent? This latter 
question may apply to all online advertising settings. Once we have a richer formal theoretical 
framework for understanding how behavioral targeting and privacy concerns interact, we will 
develop a better understanding of when it is appropriate to target the increasingly visible ads 
generated by advances in online advertising design. 
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Appendix: Further Robustness Checks 
Table A1: Replicates Table 2 with continuous scale 
Dependent Variable: Purchase intent (scale of 1-5 where 5 is highest) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exposed 0.0220*** 
(0.00512) 
0.0265*** 
(0.00475) 
0.0332*** 
(0.00355) 
0.0353*** 
(0.00328) 
     
Exposed × Context Ad 0.0455*** 
(0.0109) 
 
 
0.0204** 
(0.00816) 
 
 
     
Exposed × 
High Visibility Ad 
0.0263*** 
(0.00679) 
0.0206*** 
(0.00631) 
 
 
 
 
     
Exposed × Context × 
High Visibility 
-0.0560*** 
(0.0163) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Female 0.0146*** 
(0.00519) 
0.0146*** 
(0.00519) 
0.0147*** 
(0.00519) 
0.0147*** 
(0.00519) 
Hours on Internet 
(standardized) 
0.0414*** 
(0.00123) 
0.0414*** 
(0.00123) 
0.0414*** 
(0.00123) 
0.0414*** 
(0.00123) 
Income (standardized) -0.0366*** 
(0.00169) 
-0.0366*** 
(0.00169) 
-0.0366*** 
(0.00169) 
-0.0366*** 
(0.00169) 
Age (standardized) -0.0880*** 
(0.00259) 
-0.0880*** 
(0.00259) 
-0.0880*** 
(0.00260) 
-0.0880*** 
(0.00260) 
Observations 2464812 2464812 2464812 2464812 
Log-Likelihood -4167674.1 -4167687.8 -4167696.0 -4167700.9 
R-Squared 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 
Fixed effects at ad-site level; Robust standard errors, clustered at ad-site level, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A2: Replicates Table 3 with continuous scale 
Dependent Variable: Purchase intent (scale of 1-5 where 5 is highest) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 No 
Demographic 
Controls 
Non-
Parametric 
Controls 
Favorable 
Opinion 
No Pop-
Ups 
Multiply 
Treated 
Only ads that 
appear on both 
matched and 
unmatched 
context websites 
Exposed 0.0225*** 
(0.00507) 
0.0236*** 
(0.00299) 
0.0229*** 
(0.00444) 
0.0220*** 
(0.00509) 
0.0253*** 
(0.00446) 
0.0251*** 
(0.00509) 
       
Exposed×Context Ad 0.0461*** 
(0.0108) 
0.0208*** 
(0.00784) 
0.0433*** 
(0.0110) 
0.0443*** 
(0.0108) 
0.0509*** 
(0.0109) 
0.0450*** 
(0.0118) 
       
Exposed×High VisibilityAd 0.0253*** 
(0.00674) 
0.0134*** 
(0.00443) 
0.0255*** 
(0.00602) 
0.0265*** 
(0.00679) 
0.0227*** 
(0.00597) 
0.0228*** 
(0.00692) 
       
Exposed×Context× 
HighVisibility 
-0.0555*** 
(0.0162) 
-0.0371***
(0.0118) 
-0.0425*** 
(0.0161) 
-0.0537***
(0.0162) 
-0.0564***
(0.0152) 
-0.0577*** 
(0.0177) 
       
Female  
 
0.0370*** 
(0.00305) 
0.0173*** 
(0.00470) 
0.0146*** 
(0.00519) 
0.0152*** 
(0.00489) 
0.0146*** 
(0.00436) 
Hours on Internet 
(standardized) 
 
 
0.0266*** 
(0.00101) 
0.0411*** 
(0.00114) 
0.0414*** 
(0.00123) 
0.0404*** 
(0.00114) 
0.0422*** 
(0.00130) 
Income (standardized)  
 
-0.0154***
(0.00133) 
-0.0364*** 
(0.00156) 
-0.0366***
(0.00169) 
-0.0336***
(0.00166) 
-0.0363*** 
(0.00177) 
Age (standardized)  
 
-0.0108***
(0.00182) 
-0.0869*** 
(0.00233) 
-0.0880***
(0.00259) 
-0.0864***
(0.00250) 
-0.0848*** 
(0.00253) 
       
Age, Income, Internet Use 
Fixed Effects 
Yes No No No No No 
Observations 2464812 2443939 2932278 2464812 3196474 1976180 
Log-Likelihood -4165117.9 -3488010.7 -4958771.8 -4167674.3 -5409175.6 -3348518.8 
R-Squared 0.202 0.156 0.202 0.200 0.202 0.200 
Fixed effects at ad-site level; Robust standard errors, clustered at ad-site level, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A3: Replicates Table 5 with continuous scale 
Dependent Variable: Purchase intent (scale of 1-5 where 5 is highest) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Not Reveal  Reveals Income Private Not Private Health CPG Other CPG 
Exposed 0.0187** 
(0.00846) 
0.0233*** 
(0.00510) 
0.0257*** 
(0.00585) 
0.00472 
(0.00856) 
-0.00343 
(0.0202) 
0.0444*** 
(0.0117) 
       
Exposed×Context Ad 0.0533** 
(0.0236) 
0.0440*** 
(0.0114) 
0.0446*** 
(0.0133) 
0.0563*** 
(0.0174) 
0.117*** 
(0.0301) 
0.0705 
(0.0633) 
       
Exposed× 
High Visibility Ad 
0.0357*** 
(0.0126) 
0.0234*** 
(0.00688) 
0.0276*** 
(0.00761) 
0.0185 
(0.0138) 
0.0449 
(0.0276) 
0.0275 
(0.0181) 
       
Exposed×Context× 
High Visibility 
-0.0912*** 
(0.0341) 
-0.0473*** 
(0.0174) 
-0.0588***
(0.0187) 
-0.0505 
(0.0350) 
-0.245*** 
(0.0686) 
-0.0552 
(0.0731) 
       
Female 0.0295*** 
(0.00711) 
0.0168*** 
(0.00545) 
0.0227*** 
(0.00581) 
-0.0230** 
(0.0114) 
0.0755** 
(0.0314) 
0.182*** 
(0.0131) 
Hours on Internet 
(standardized) 
0.0292*** 
(0.00265) 
0.0428*** 
(0.00133) 
0.0416*** 
(0.00137) 
0.0398*** 
(0.00284) 
0.0491*** 
(0.00526) 
0.0542*** 
(0.00452) 
Income (standardized) N/A 
 
-0.0368*** 
(0.00169) 
-0.0379***
(0.00192) 
-0.0302***
(0.00344) 
-0.0452*** 
(0.00653) 
-0.0483*** 
(0.00525) 
Age (standardized) -0.107*** 
(0.00399) 
-0.0830*** 
(0.00252) 
-0.0794***
(0.00289) 
-0.130*** 
(0.00545) 
-0.128*** 
(0.0120) 
-0.0458*** 
(0.00819) 
Observations 390608 2074204 2038776 426036 114922 192609 
Log-Likelihood -655863.6 -3504391.6 -3466766.5 -699515.4 -195107.6 -335447.4 
R-Squared 0.219 0.202 0.176 0.285 0.177 0.164 
Fixed effects at ad-site level; Robust standard errors, clustered at ad-site level, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
Table A4: Four-way interaction specification 
Dependent Variable: Purchase Intent (Indicator for Very Likely to make a Purchase) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Does not 
reveal 
income 
Privacy-
related 
category 
CPG only 
Exposed 0.00882*** 
(0.00113) 
0.00515*** 
(0.00119) 
0.00860** 
(0.00345) 
Exposed×Context Ad 0.00529* 
(0.00314) 
0.00846** 
(0.00343) 
0.0133 
(0.0137) 
Exposed×High Visibility Ad 0.00112 
(0.00166) 
0.00486*** 
(0.00171) 
0.0107** 
(0.00518) 
Exposed×Context Ad× 
High Visibility Ad 
-0.00631 
(0.00465) 
-0.00958** 
(0.00483) 
-0.0161 
(0.0181) 
Female 0.0122*** 
(0.00123) 
0.0117*** 
(0.00123) 
0.0571*** 
(0.00354) 
Std. Weekly Hours on Internet 0.0111*** 
(0.000355) 
0.0113*** 
(0.000356) 
0.0137*** 
(0.00103) 
Std. Income  -0.00171***
(0.000415) 
-0.00182***
(0.000418) 
-0.00632***
(0.00117) 
Std. Age -0.00959***
(0.000588) 
-0.00953***
(0.000589) 
-0.00401** 
(0.00192) 
Exposed×Income Secret -0.0253*** 
(0.00157) 
 
 
 
Exposed×Context Ad×Income Secret 0.0257*** 
(0.00641) 
 
 
 
Exposed×High Visibility 
Ad×Income Secret 
0.0266*** 
(0.00284) 
 
 
 
Exposed×Context Ad×  
High Visiblity×Income Secret 
-0.0369*** 
(0.00919) 
 
 
 
Exposed×Private Site  
 
-0.00353 
(0.00324) 
 
Exposed×Context Ad×Private Site  
 
0.00563 
(0.00667) 
 
Exposed×High Visibility Ad× 
Private Site 
 
 
0.00553 
(0.00503) 
 
Exposed×Context Ad× 
High Visiblity×Private Site 
 
 
-0.0183* 
(0.0109) 
 
Exposed×Health CPG  
 
 
 
-0.0135** 
(0.00661) 
Exposed×Context Ad×Health CPG  
 
 
 
0.0294* 
(0.0172) 
Exposed×High Visibility Ad×  
Health CPG 
 
 
 
 
0.0111 
(0.00991) 
Exposed×Context Ad×  
High Visibility× Health CPG 
 
 
 
 
-0.0677*** 
(0.0258) 
Observations 2464812 2464812 290982 
Log-Likelihood -1061852.2 -1062304.4 -150500.1 
R-Squared 0.141 0.141 0.148 
Fixed effects at ad-site level; Robust standard errors, clustered at ad-site level, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 Numerous lower-order interactions not involving exposure included but not reported.  
